papers

Publications

  • Apparent Relationality as the Mark of the Mental Sythese Library, Springer (ed. A. Voltolini) (forthcoming)
  • Introspecting the World in Consciousness and Inner Awareness (eds. A. Giustina, D. Bordini, A. Dewalque) (forthcoming)
  • Intentionality and Representation: Two Kinds of Aboutness. Australasian Philosophical Review (forthcoming)
  • Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View. The Philosophical Quarterly (2024)
  • Empty Space, Silence, and Absence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2021)
  • Intentionality as Intentional Inexistence. Inquiry (2021)
  • Beyond Adverbialism: A New Non-relational Theory of Perceptual Experience. Mind & Language (2021)
  • Perceptual Experience and Physicalism. In Purpose and Procedure in Philosphy of Perception. (Eds. H. Logue and L. Richardson) (2021)
  • A New Theory of Absence Experience. European Journal of Philosophy (2020)
  • Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experience are Transparent. European Journal of Philosophy (2019)
  • Colour Hallucination: A New Problem for Externalist Representationalism. Analysis (2017)
  • Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism. Ratio (2017)
  • The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency. The Philosophical Quarterly (2016)
  • Colour. Philosophy Compass (2014)

Book reviews / Critical Notices

  • Making Mistakes about our Mental States (discussion of Neil van Leeuwen' s Religion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity) Religion, Brain and Behavior (forthcoming)
  • Are Sensory Experiences Contingently Representational? A Critical Notice of David Papineau's, the Metaphysics of Sensory Experience. Mind & Language (Papineau's response).
  • Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Account of Spacetime and its Contents, by Michael Pelczar. In Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).

Work in progress

  • The Temporal Profile of Absense Experience.
  • A New Theory of Belief-Discordant Behaviour.
  • The Unavoidable Non-Veridicality of Colour Experience.
  • Intentionality is not Representation.
  • Is Amodal Perception really Perceptual?

Please email me at L.Gow@liverpool.ac.uk for copies of these papers.