Publications
- Intentionality and Representation: Two Kinds of Aboutness. Australasian Philosophical Review (forthcoming)
- Empty Space, Silence, and Absence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
- Intentionality as Intentional Inexistence. Inquiry (2021)
- Beyond Adverbialism: A New Non-relational Theory of Perceptual Experience. Mind & Language (2021)
- Perceptual Experience and Physicalism. In Purpose and Procedure in Philosphy of Perception. (Eds. Heather Logue and Louise Richardson) (2021)
- A New Theory of Absence Experience. European Journal of Philosophy (2020)
- Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experience are Transparent. European Journal of Philosophy (2019)
- Colour Hallucination: A New Problem for Externalist Representationalism. Analysis (2017)
- Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism. Ratio (2017)
- The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency. The Philosophical Quarterly (2016)
- Colour. Philosophy Compass (2014)
These papers can be found on academia
Book reviews / Critical Notices
- Are Sensory Experiences Contingently Representational? A Critical Notice of David Papineau's, the Metaphysics of Sensory Experience. Mind & Language (Papineau's response).
- Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Account of Spacetime and its Contents, by Michael Pelczar. In Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).
Work in progress
- Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View.
- Colour Experience without Experience of Colour.
- Intentionality is not Representation.
- Is Amodal Perception really Perceptual?
Please email me at L.Gow@liverpool.ac.uk for copies of these papers.